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Abstract
We revisit the classical problem of converting an imperfect source of randomness into a usable
cryptographic key. Assume that we have some cryptographic application P that expects a uniformly
random m-bit key R and ensures that the best attack (in some complexity class) against P (R) has
success probability at most δ. Our goal is to design a key-derivation function (KDF) h that converts
any random source X of min-entropy k into a sufficiently “good” key h(X), guaranteeing that P (h(X))
has comparable security δ′ which is ‘close’ to δ.
Seeded randomness extractors provide a generic way to solve this problem for all applications P ,
with resulting security δ′ = O(δ), provided that we start with entropy k ≥ m + 2 log (1/δ) − O(1).
By a result of Radhakrishnan and Ta-Shma, this bound on k (called the “RT-bound”) is also known
to be tight in general. Unfortunately, in many situations the loss of 2 log (1/δ) bits of entropy is
unacceptable. This motivates the study KDFs with less entropy waste by placing some restrictions on
the source X or the application P .
In this work we obtain the following new positive and negative results in this regard:
• Efficient samplability of the source X does not help beat the RT-bound for general applications.
This resolves the SRT (samplable RT) conjecture of Dachman-Soled et al. [DGKM12] in the
affirmative, and also shows that the existence of computationally-secure extractors beating the
RT-bound implies the existence of one-way functions.
• We continue in the line of work initiated by Barak et al. [BDK+11] and construct new information-
theoretic KDFs which beat the RT-bound for large but restricted classes of applications. Specif-
ically, we design efficient KDFs that work for all unpredictability applications P (e.g., signatures,
MACs, one-way functions, etc.) and can either: (1) extract all of the entropy k = m with a very
modest security loss δ′ = O(δ · log (1/δ)), or alternatively, (2) achieve essentially optimal security
δ′ = O(δ) with a very modest entropy loss k ≥ m + loglog (1/δ). In comparison, the best prior
results from [BDK+11] for this class of applications would only guarantee δ′ = O(
√
δ) when
k = m, and would need k ≥ m+ log (1/δ) to get δ′ = O(δ).
• The weaker bounds of [BDK+11] hold for a larger class of so-called “square-friendly” applications
(which includes all unpredictability, but also some important indistinguishability, applications).
Unfortunately, we show that these weaker bounds are tight for the larger class of applications.
• We abstract out a clean, information-theoretic notion of (k, δ, δ′)-unpredictability extractors,
which guarantee “induced” security δ′ for any δ-secure unpredictability application P , and char-
acterize the parameters achievable for such unpredictability extractors. Of independent interest,
we also relate this notion to the previously-known notion of (min-entropy) condensers, and im-
prove the state-of-the-art parameters for such condensers.
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1 Introduction
Key Derivation is a fundamental cryptographic task arising in a wide variety of situations where a
given application P was designed to work with a uniform m-bit key R, but in reality one only has a
“weak” n-bit random source X. Examples of such sources include biometric data [DORS08, BDK+05],
physical sources [BST03, BH05], secrets with partial leakage, and group elements from Diffie-Hellman
key exchange [GKR04, Kra10], to name a few. We’d like to have a Key Derivation Function (KDF)
h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m with the property that the derived key h(X) can be safely used by P , even though
the original security of P was only analyzed under the assumption that its key R is uniformly random.
Of course, good key derivation is generally impossible unless X has some amount of entropy k to begin
with, where the “right” notion of entropy in this setting is min-entropy: a source X has min-entropy
H∞(X) = k if for any x ∈ {0, 1}n we must have Pr[X = x] ≤ 2−k. We call such a distribution X
over n-bits strings an (n, k)-source, and generally wish to design a KDF h which “works” for all such
(n, k)-sources X. More formally, assuming P was δ-secure (against some class of attackers) with the
uniform key R ≡ Um, we would like to conclude that P is still δ′-secure (against nearly the same class
of attackers) when using R = h(X) instead. The two most important parameters are: (1) ensuring
that the new security δ′ is “as close as possible” to the original security δ, and (2) allowing the source
entropy k to be “as close as possible” to the application’s key length m. Minimizing this threshold k
is very important in many practical situations. For example, in the setting of biometrics and physical
randomness, many natural sources are believed to have very limited entropy, while in the setting of
Diffie-Hellman key exchange reducing the size of the Diffie-Hellman group (which is roughly 2k) results
in substantial efficiency improvements. Additionally, we prefer to achieve information-theoretic security
for our KDFs (we discuss “computational KDFs” in Section 1.2), so that the derived key can be used for
arbitrary (information-theoretic and computational) applications P .
This discussion leads us to the following central question of our work: Can one find reasonable
application scenarios where one can design a provably-secure, information-theoretic KDF achieving
“real security” δ′ ≈ δ when k ≈ m? More precisely, for a given (class of) application(s) P ,
(A) What is the best (provably) achievable security δ′ (call it δ∗) when k = m?
(B) What is the smallest (provable) entropy threshold k (call it k∗) to achieve security δ′ = O(δ)?
Ideally, we would like to get δ∗ = δ and k∗ = m, and the question is how close one can come to these
“ideal” bounds. In this work we will provide several positive and negative answers to our main question,
including a general way to nearly achieve the above “ideal” for all unpredictability applications. But first
we turn to what is known in the theory of key derivation.
Randomness Extractors. In theory, the cleanest way to design a general, information-theoretically
secure KDF is by using so called (strong) randomness extractors [NZ96]. Such a (k, ε)-extractor Ext has
the property that the output distribution Ext(X) is ε-statistically close to the uniform distribution Um,
which means that using Ext(X) as a key will degrade the original security δ of any application P by
at most ε: δ′ ≤ δ + ε. However, the sound use of randomness extractors comes with two important
caveats. The first caveat comes from the fact that no deterministic extractor Ext can work for all (n, k)-
sources [CG89] when k < n, which means that extractors must be probabilistic, or “seeded”. This by
itself is not a big limitation, since the extracted randomness Ext(X;S) is ε-close to Um even conditioned
on the seed S, which means that the seed S can be reused and globally shared across many applications.1
From our perspective, though, a more important limitation/caveat of randomness extractors comes from
a non-trivial tradeoff between the min-entropy k and the security ε one can achieve to derive an m-bit key
1However, it does come with an important assumption that the source distribution X must be independent of the seed
S. Although this assumption could be problematic in some situations, such as leakage-resilient cryptography (and has led
to some interesting research [TV00, CDH+00, KZ03, DRV12]), in many situations, such as the Diffie-Hellman key exchange
or biometrics, the independence of the source and the seed could be naturally enforced/assumed.
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Ext(X;S). The best randomness extractors, such as the one given by the famous Leftover Hash Lemma
(LHL) [HILL99], can only achieve security ε =
√
2m−k. This gives the following very general bound on
δ′ for all applications P :
δ′ ≤ δALL def= δ +
√
2m−k (1)
Translating this bound to answer our main questions (A) and (B) above, we see that δ∗ = 1 (no meaningful
security is achieved when k = m) and min-entropy k∗ ≥ m+2 log (1/δ)−O(1) is required to get δ′ = O(δ).
For example, to derive a 128-bit key for a CBC-MAC with security δ ≈ δ′ ≈ 2−64, one needs k ≈ 256 bits
of min-entropy, and nothing is theoretically guaranteed when k = 128.
Of course, part of the reason why these provable bounds are “not too great” (compared both with the
“ideal” bounds, as well as the “real” bounds we will achieve shortly) is their generality: extractors work for
all (n, k)-sources X and all applications P . Unfortunately, Radhakrishnan and Ta-shma [RTS00] showed
that in this level of generality nothing better is possible: any (k, ε)-extractor must have k ≥ m+2 log (1/ε)
(we will refer to this as the “RT-bound”). This implies that for any candidate m-bit extractor Ext there
exists some application P , some (possibly inefficiently samplable) source X of min-entropy k and some
(possibly exponential time) attacker A, such that A(S) can break P keyed by R = Ext(X;S) with
advantage
√
2m−k.
Thus, there is hope that better results are possible if one restricts the type of applications P (e.g.,
unpredictability applications), sources X (e.g., efficiently samplable) or attackers A (e.g., polynomial-
time) considered. We discuss such options below, stating what was known together with our new results.
1.1 Our Main Results
Efficiently Samplable Sources. One natural restriction is to require that the source X is efficiently
sampleable. This restriction is known to be useful for relaxing the assumption that the source distribution
X is independent of the seed S [TV00, DRV12], which was the first caveat in using randomness extractors.
Unfortunately, it was not clear if efficient samplability of X helps with reducing the entropy loss L = k−m
below 2 log (1/ε). In fact, Dachman-Soled et al. [DGKM12] conjectured that this is indeed not the case
when Ext is also efficient, naming this conjecture the “SRT assumption” (where SRT stands for “samplable
RT”).
SRT Assumption [DGKM12]: For any efficient extractor Ext with m-bit output there exists an effi-
ciently samplable (polynomial in n) distribution X of min-entropy k = m+ 2 log (1/ε)−O(1) and a (gen-
erally inefficient) distinguisher D which has at least an ε-advantage in distinguishing (S,R = Ext(X;S))
from (S,R = Um).
As our first result, we show that the SRT assumption is indeed (unfortunately) true, even without
restricting the extractor Ext to be efficient.
Theorem 1.1. (Informal) The SRT assumption is true for any (possibly inefficient) extractor Ext.
Thus, efficiently samplability does not help to reduce the entropy loss of extractors below 2 log (1/ε).
Square-Friendly Applications. The next natural restriction is to limit the class of applications P in
question. Perhaps, for some such applications, one can argue that the derived key R = hs(X) is still “good
enough” for P despite not being statistically close to Um (given s). This approach was recently pioneered
by Barak et al [BDK+11], and then further extended and generalized by Dodis et al. [DRV12, DY13].
In these works the authors defined a special class of cryptographic applications, called square-friendly,
where the pessimistic RT-bound can be provably improved. Intuitively, while any traditional application
P demands that the expectation (over the uniform distribution r ← Um) of the attacker’s advantage
f(r) on key r is at most δ, square-friendly applications additionally require that the expected value of
f(r)2 is also bounded by δ. The works of [BDK+11, DY13] then showed that the class of square-friendly
applications includes all unpredictability applications (signatures, MACs, one-way functions, etc.), and
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some, but not all, indistinguishability applications (including chosen plaintext attack secure encryption,
weak pseudorandom functions and others). 2 Additionally, for all such square-friendly applications P ,
it was shown that universal (and thus also the stronger pairwise independent) hash functions {hs} yield
the following improved bound on the security δ′ of the derived key R = hs(X):
δ′ ≤ δSQF def= δ +
√
δ · 2m−k (2)
This provable (and still relatively general!) bound lies somewhere in between the “ideal” bounds and
the fully generic bound (1): in particular, for the first time we get a meaningful security δ∗ ≈ √δ when
k = m (giving non-trivial answer to Question (A)), or, alternatively, we get full security δ′ = O(δ) provided
k∗ ≥ m + log (1/δ) (giving much improved answer to Question (B) than the bound k∗ ≥ k + 2 log (1/δ)
derived by using standard extractors). For example, to derive a 128-bit key for a CBC-MAC having ideal
security δ = 2−64, we can either settle for much lower security δ′ ≈ 2−32 from entropy k = 128, or get
full security δ′ ≈ 2−64 from entropy k = 192.
Given these non-trivial improvements, one can wonder if further improvements (for square-friendly
applications) are still possible. As a simple (negative) result, we show that the bound in Equation (2)
cannot be improved in general for all square-friendly applications. Interestingly, the proof of this result
uses the proof of Theorem 1.1 to produce the desired source X for the counter-example.
Theorem 1.2. (Informal) There exists a δ-square friendly application P with an m-bit key such that for
any family H = {hs} of m-bit key derivation functions there exists (even efficiently samplable) (n, k)-
source X and a (generally inefficient) distinguisher D such that D(S) has at least δ′ = Ω(
√
δ · 2m−k)
advantage in breaking P with the derived key R = hS(X) (for random seed S).
Hence, to improve the parameters in Equation (2) and still have information-theoretic security, we
must place more restrictions on the class of applications P we consider.
Unpredictability Applications. This brings us to our main (positive) result: we get improved
information-theoretic key derivation for all unpredictability applications (which includes MACs, signa-
tures, one-way functions, identification schemes, etc.; see Footnote 2).
Theorem 1.3. (Main Result; Informal) Assume P is any unpredictability application which is δ-secure
with a uniform m-bit key against some class of attackers C. Then, there is an efficient family of hash
functions H = {hs : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m}, such that for any (n, k)-source X, the application P with the
derived key R = hS(X) (for random public seed S) is δ
′-secure against class C, where:
δ′ = O
(
1 + log (1/δ) · 2m−k
)
δ. (3)
In particular, we get the following nearly optimal answers to Questions (A) and (B):
- With entropy k = m, we get security δ∗ = (1 + log (1/δ))δ (answering Question (A)).
- To get security δ′ ≤ 3δ, we only need entropy k∗ = m+ loglog (1/δ) + 4 (answering Question (B)).
In fact, our basic KDF hash family H is simply a t-wise independent hash function where t =
O(log (1/δ)). Hence, by using higher than pairwise independence (which was enough for weaker security
given by Equations (1) and (2)), we get a largely improved entropy loss: loglog (1/δ) instead of log (1/δ).
As we can see, the provable bounds above nearly match the ideal bounds δ∗ = δ and k∗ = m and
provide a vast improvement over what was known previously. For example, to derive a 128-bit key for a
CBC-MAC having ideal security δ = 2−64 (so that loglog (1/δ) = 6), we can either have excellent security
δ′ ≤ 2−57.9 starting with minimal entropy k = 128, or get essentially full security δ′ ≤ 2−62.4 with only
slightly higher entropy k = 138. Thus, for the first time we obtained an efficient, theoretically-sound key
2Recall, in indistinguishability applications the goal of the attack is to win a game with probability noticeably greater
than 1/2; in contrast, for unpredictability applications the goal of the attacker is to win with only non-negligible probability.
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derivation scheme which nearly matches “dream” parameters k∗ = m and δ∗ = δ. Alternatively, as we
discuss in Section 1.2, for the first time we can offer a provably-secure alternative to the existing practice
of using cryptographic hash functions modeled as a random oracle for KDFs, and achieve nearly optimal
parameters.
Unpredictability Extractors and Condensers. To better understand the proof of Theorem 1.3,
it is helpful to abstract the notion of an unpredictability extractor UExt which we define in this work.
Recall, standard (k, ε)-extractors ε-fool any distinguisher D(R,S) trying to distinguish R = Ext(X;S)
from R being uniform. In contrast, when dealing with δ-secure unpredictability applications, we only
care about “fooling” so called δ-distinguishers D: these are distinguishers s.t. Pr[D(Um, S) = 1] ≤ δ,
which directly corresponds to the emulation of P ’s security experiment between the “actual attacker” A
and the challenger C. Thus, we define (k, δ, δ′)-unpredictability extractors as having the property that
Pr[D(UExt(X;S), S) = 1] ≤ δ′ for any δ-distinguisher D.3 With this cleaner notion in mind, our main
Theorem 1.3 can be equivalently restated as follows:
Theorem 1.4. (Main Result; Restated) A family H = {hs : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m} which is O(log (1/δ))-
wise independent defines a (k, δ, O(1 + log (1/δ) · 2m−k)δ)-unpredictability extractor UExt(x; s) = hs(x).
In turn, we observe that unpredictability extractors are closely connected to the related notion of
a randomness condenser [RR99, RSW06]: such a (k, `, ε)-condenser Cond : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m has the
property that the output distribution Cond(X;S) is ε-close (even given the seed S) to some distribution
Y s.t. the conditional min-entropy H∞(Y |S) ≥ m − ` whenever H∞(X) ≥ k. In particular, instead of
requiring the output to be close to uniform, we require it to be close to having almost full entropy, with
some small “gap” `. While ` = 0 gives back the definition of (k, ε)-extractors, permitting a small non-zero
“entropy gap” ` has recently found important applications for key derivation [BDK+11, DRV12, DY13].
In particular, it is easy to see that a (k, `, ε)-condenser is also a (k, δ, ε+ δ ·2`)-unpredictability extractor.
Thus, to show Theorem 1.4 it suffices to show that O(log (1/δ))-wise independent hashing gives a (k, `, δ)-
condenser, where ` ≈ loglog (1/δ).
Theorem 1.5. (Informal) A family H = {hs : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m} of O(log (1/δ))-wise independent hash
functions defines a (k, `, δ)-condenser Cond(x; s) = hs(x) for either of the following settings:
- No Entropy Loss: min-entropy k = m and entropy gap ` = loglog (1/δ).
- Constant Entropy Gap: min-entropy k = m+ loglog (1/δ) +O(1) and entropy gap ` = 1.
It is instructive to compare this result with the RT-bound for (k, δ)-extractors: to have no entropy
gap ` = 0 requires us to start with entropy k ≥ m+ 2 log (1/δ). However, already 1-bit entropy gap ` = 1
allows us to get away with k = m + loglog (1/δ), while further increasing the gap to ` = loglog (1/δ)
results in no entropy loss k = m.
Balls and Bins, Max-Load and Balanced Hashing. Finally, to prove Theorem 1.5 (and, thus,
Theorem 1.4 and Theorem 1.3) we further reduce the problem of condensers to a very simple balls-and-
bins problem. Indeed, we can think of our (k, `, δ)-condenser as a way to hash 2k items (out of a universe
of size 2n) into 2m bins, so that the load (number of items per bin) is not too much larger than the
expected 2k−m for “most” of the bins. More concretely, it boils down to analyzing a version of average-
load: if we choose a random item (and a random hash function from the family) then the probability
that the item lands in a bin with more than 2`(2k−m) items should be at most ε. We use Chernoff-type
bounds for limited independence [Sie89, BR94] to analyze this version of average load when the hash
function is O(log 1/δ)-independent.
Optimizing Seed Length. The description length d of our O(log (1/δ))-wise independent KDF hs
is d = O(n log (1/δ)) bits, which is much larger than that needed by universal hashing for standard
3This notion can also be viewed as “one-sided” slice extractors [RTS00]. Unlike this work, though, the authors of [RTS00]
did not use slice extractors as an interesting primitive by itself, and did not offer any constructions of such extractors.
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extractors. We adapt the elegant “gradual increase of independence” technique of Celis et al. [CRSW11]
to reduce the seed length to nearly linear: d = O(n log k) (e.g., for k = 128 and δ = 2−64 this reduces
the seed length from 128n to roughly 7n bits). It is an interesting open problem if the seed length can
be reduced even further (and we show non-constructively that the answer is positive).
1.2 Computational Extractors
So far we considered information-theoretic techniques for designing theoretically-sound KDFs. Of course,
given the importance of the problem, it is also natural to see if better parameters can be obtained when
we assume that the attacker A is computationally bounded. We restrict our attention to the study of
computational extractors [DGH+04, Kra10, DGKM12] Ext, whose output R = Ext(X;S) looks pseudo-
random to D (given S) for any efficiently samplable (n, k)-source X, which would suffice for our KDF
goals if very strong results were possible for such extractors.
Unfortunately, while not ruling out the usefulness of computational extractors, we point out the
following three negative results: (1) even “heuristic” computational computational extractors do not
appear to beat the information-theoretic bound k∗ ≥ m (which we managed to nearly match for all
unpredictability applications); (2) existing “provably-secure” computational extractors do not appear
to offer any improvement to our information-theoretic KDFs, when dealing with the most challenging
“low entropy regime” (when k is roughly equal to the security parameter); (3) even for “medium-to-high
entropy regimes”, computational extractors beating the RT-bound require one-way functions. We expand
on these results below.
Heuristic Extractors. In practice, one would typically use so called “cryptographic hash function”
h, such as SHA or MD5, for key derivation (or as a computational extractor). As discussed in detail
by [DGH+04, Kra10, DRV12], there are several important reasons for this choice. From the perspective
of this work, we will focus on the arguably the most important such reason — the common belief that
cryptographic hash functions achieve excellent security δ′ ≈ δ already when k ≈ m. This can be easily
justified in the random oracle model; assuming the KDF h is a random oracle which can be evaluated
on at most q points (where q is the upper bound of the attacker’s running time), one can upper bound
δ′ ≤ δ + q/2k, where q/2k is the probability the attacker evaluates h(X). In turn, for most natural
computationally-secure applications, in time q the attacker can also test about q out of 2m possible m-bit
keys, and hence achieve advantage q/2m. This means that the ideal security δ of P cannot be lower than
q/2m, implying q ≤ δ · 2m. Plugging this bound on q in the bound of δ′ ≤ δ + q/2k above, we get that
using a random oracle (RO) as a computational extractor/KDF achieves real security
δ′ ≤ δRO def= δ + δ · 2m−k (4)
Although this heuristic bound is indeed quite amazing (e.g., δ′ ≤ 2δ even when k = m, meaning that
δ∗ = 2δ and k∗ = m), and, unsurprisingly, beats our provably-secure, information-theoretic bounds, it
still requires k∗ ≥ m. So we are not that far off, especially given our nearly matching bound for all
unpredictability applications.4
And, of course, as with any analysis in the random oracle model [CGH98], the bound above is
ultimately a heuristic. Moreover, as was pointed out by [DGH+04, Kra10], existing hash functions,
such as SHA and MD5, are far from ideal, since they use a highly structured Merkle-Damgard mode of
operation when processing long inputs. In particular, the provable “extraction bounds” [DGH+04] one
gets when taking this structure into account are nowhere close to the amazing bound in (4), even under
the generous assumption that the “compression function” f of h is “ideal”.
Extract-then-Expand Approach. Turning to provable constructions, one very natural way to build
computational extractors is the folklore extract-then-expand approach (recently explored in more detail
4Also, unlike our bound in Equation (3), one cannot apply the heuristic bound from Equation (4) to derive a key for an
information-theoretically secure MAC.
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by [Kra10, DGKM12]). The idea is to define Ext(X;S) = Prg(Ext′(X;S)), where Prg : {0, 1}m′ → {0, 1}m
is a computationally (t, δPRG)-secure pseudorandom generator (PRG), and Ext
′ is an information-theoretic
(k, ε)-extractor with an m′-bit output. It is clear that the resulting computational extractor has has
security δPRG + ε, which means that R = Ext(X;S) can be used in any computationally (t, δ)-secure
application P , and result in (t, δ′)-security, where δ′ ≤ δ + ε + δPRG. In particular, it is tempting to
set δPRG ≈ ε ≈ δ, which gives δ′ = O(δ), and ask what is the smallest entropy threshold for k where
such setting of parameters is possible. In other words, how good is the extract-then-expand approach for
answering our Question (B)?
Unfortunately, we show that the resulting parameters must be poor, at least for the low-entropy
settings we care about. Indeed, since the best information-theoretic security δ for the extractor Ext′ is
δ =
√
2k−m′ [RTS00], we get that the best value of k we can hope for is k = m′ + 2 log (1/δ), where m′ is
the smallest possible seed length for a (t, δ)-secure PRG. However, it is well known (e.g., see [DTT10])
than any non-trivial (m′, δ)-secure PRG with an m’-bit seed must have seed length m′ > 2 log (1/δ). This
gives a lower bound k > 4 log (1/δ) even for linear-time distinguishers (and the bound actually gets worse
when t grows). For example, if δ = 2−64, we get k > 256, which is already worse that the naive bound we
directly got from an information-theoretic secure extractor when m = 128 (see Equation (1)). Indeed, in
this case the PRG itself must have a longer seed m′ > 128 than the derived 128-bit key we are looking
for! Thus, although the extract-then-expand approach is indeed useful for medium-to-high rage values of
k (e.g., k  256), it does not appear to be of any use for the more important low-entropy (e.g., k < 256)
scenarios.
Indeed, the best currently known computational extractor [DY12] closely follows the information-
theoretic techniques developed for square-friendly applications [BDK+11], by building a square-friendly
computational KDF. (Interestingly, the final construction resembles a “dual” of the extract-then-expand
approach, and could be called “expand-then-extract”.) It achieves k ≥ m + 2 log (1/δ) − log(1/δPRG),
where δPRG is the security of the given PRG. In practical terms, it could work when k ≈ 192, which is
still not as good as what we would expect from heuristic extractors (which appear to work already when
k ≈ 128).
Beating RT-bound Implies OWFs. Despite provably failing for low-entropy regimes, the extract-
then-expand approach at least showed that computational assumptions help in “beating” the RT-bound
k ≥ m+2 log (1/ε) for any (k, ε)-secure extractor, as applying the PRG allows one to increase m essentially
arbitrarily (while keeping k = m′+2 log (1/ε)). Motivated by this, Dachman-Soled et al. [DGKM12] asked
an interesting theoretical question if the existence of one-way functions (and, hence, PRGs [HILL99]) is
essential for beating the RT-bound for unconditional extractors. They also managed to give an affirmative
answer to this question under the SRT assumption mentioned earlier. Since we unconditionally prove the
SRT assumption (see Theorem 1.1), we immediately get the following Corollary, removing the conditional
clause from the result of [DGKM12]:
Theorem 1.6. (Informal) If Ext is an efficient (k, ε)-computational extractor with an m-bit output, where
m > k − 2 log (1/ε)−O(1), then one-way functions (and, hence, PRGs) exist.
2 Preliminaries
We recap some definitions and results from probability theory. Let X,Y be random variables with
supports SX , SY , respectively. We define their statistical difference as
∆(X,Y ) =
1
2
∑
u∈SX∪SY
|Pr[X = u]− Pr[Y = u]| .
We write X ≈ε Y and say that X and Y are ε-statistically close to denote that ∆(X,Y ) ≤ ε.
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The min-entropy of a random variable X is H∞(X)
def
= − log(maxx Pr[X = x]), and measures the “best
guess” for X. The conditional min-entropy is defined by H∞(X|Y = y) def= − log(maxx Pr[X = x|Y = y]).
Following Dodis et al. [DORS08], we define the average conditional min-entropy:
H∞(X|Y ) def= − log
(
E
y←Y
[
max
x
Pr[X = x|Y = y]
])
= − log
(
E
y←Y
[
2−H∞(X|Y=y)
])
.
Above, and throughout the paper, all “log” terms are base 2, unless indicated otherwise. We say that a
random variable X is an (n, k)-source if the support of X is {0, 1}n and the entropy of X is H∞(X) ≥ k.
Lemma 2.1 (A Tail Inequality [BR94]). Let q ≥ 4 be an even integer. Suppose X1, . . . , Xn are q-wise
independent random variables taking values in [0, 1]. Let X := X1 + · · · + Xn and define µ := E[X] be
the expectation of the sum. Then, for any A > 0, Pr[|X − µ| ≥ A] ≤ 8
(
qµ+q2
A2
)q/2
. In particular, for any
α > 0 and µ > q, we have Pr[X ≥ (1 + α)µ] ≤ 8
(
2q
α2µ
)q/2
.
3 Defining Extractors for Unpredictability Applications
We start by abstracting out the notion of general unpredictability applications (e.g., one-way functions,
signatures, message authentication codes, soundness of an argument, etc.) as follows. The security of
such all such primitives is abstractly defined via a security game P which requires that, for all attackers
A (in some complexity class), Pr[PA(U) = 1] ≤ δ where PA(U) denotes the execution of the game P
with the attacker A, where P uses the uniform randomness U .5 For example, in the case of a message-
authentication code (MAC), the value U is used as secret key for the MAC scheme and the game P is
the standard “existential unforgeability against chosen-message attack game” for the given MAC. Next,
we will assume that δ is some small (e.g., negligible) value, and ask the question if we can still use the
primitive P if, instead of a uniformly random U , we only have some arbitrary (n, k)-source X?
To formally answer this question, we would like a function UExt : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m (seeded
unpredictability extractor) such that, for all attackersA (in some complexity class), Pr[PA(S)(UExt(X;S)) =
1] ≤ ε, where the seed S is chosen uniformly at random and given to the attacker, and ε is not much
larger than δ. Since we do not wish to assume much about the application P or the attacker A, we can
roll them up into a unified adversarial “distinguisher” defined by D(R,S) := PA(S)(R). By definition, if
R = U is random and independent of S, then Pr[D(U, S) = 1] = Pr[PA(S)(U) = 1] ≤ δ. On the other
hand, we need to ensure that Pr[PA(S)(UExt(X;S)) = 1] = Pr[D(UExt(X;S), S) = 1] ≤ ε for some ε
which is not much larger than δ. This motivates the following definition of unpredictability extractor
which ensures that the above holds for all distinguishers D.
Definition 3.1 (UExtract). We say that a function D : {0, 1}m × {0, 1}d → {0, 1} is a δ-distinguisher
if Pr[D(U, S) = 1] ≤ δ where (U, S) is uniform over {0, 1}m × {0, 1}d. A function UExt : {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a (k, δ, ε)-unpredictability extractor (UExtract) if for any (n, k)-source X and any
δ-distinguisher D, we have Pr[D(UExt(X;S), S) = 1] ≤ ε where S is uniform over {0, 1}d.
Notice that the above definition is essentially the same as that of standard extractors except that: (1)
we require that the distinguisher has a “small” probability δ of outputting 1 on the uniform distribution,
and (2) we only require a one-sided error that the probability of outputting 1 does not increase too much.
A similar notion was also proposed by [RTS00] and called a “slice extractor”.
Toward the goal of understanding unpredictability extractors, we show tight connections between the
above definition and two seemingly unrelated notions. Firstly, we define “condensers for min-entropy” and
show that the they yield “good” unpredictability extractors. Second, we define something called “balanced
hash functions” and show that they yield good condensers, and therefore also good unpredictability
5In contrast, for indistinguishability games we typically require that Pr[PA(U) = 1] ≤ 1
2
+ δ.
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extractors. Lastly, we show that unpredictability extractors also yield balanced hash functions, meaning
that all three notions are essentially equivalent up to a small gap in parameters.
Definition 3.2 (Condenser). A function Cond : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a (k, `, ε)-condenser if for
all (n, k)-sources X, and a uniformly random and independent seed S over {0, 1}d, the joint distribution
(S,Cond(X;S)) is ε-statistically-close to some joint distribution (S, Y ) such that, for all s ∈ {0, 1}d,
H∞(Y |S = s) ≥ m− `.
First, we show that condensers already give us unpredictability extractors. This is similar in spirit to
a lemma of [DY13] which shows that, if we use a key with a small entropy gap for an unpredictability
application, the security of the application is only reduced by at most a small amount. One difference
that prevents us from using that lemma directly is that we need to explicitly include the seed of the
condenser and the dependence between the condenser output and the seed.
Lemma 3.3 (Condenser⇒ UExtract). Any (k, `, ε)-condenser is a (k, δ, ε∗)-UExtract where ε∗ = ε+2`δ.
Proof. Let Cond : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be a (k, `, ε)-condenser and let X be an (n, k)-source. Let
S be uniform over {0, 1}d, so that, by definition, there is a joint distribution (S, Y ) which has statistical
distance at most ε from (S,Cond(X;S)) such that H∞(Y |S = s) ≥ m− ` for all s ∈ {0, 1}d. Therefore,
for any δ-distinguisher D, we have
Pr[D(Cond(X;S), S) = 1] ≤ ε+ Pr[D(Y, S) = 1]
= ε+
∑
y,s
Pr[S = s] Pr[Y = y|S = s] Pr[D(y, s) = 1]
≤ ε+
∑
y,s
2−d2−H∞(Y |S=s) Pr[D(y, s) = 1]
≤ ε+ 2`
∑
y,s
2−(m+d) Pr[D(y, s) = 1] ≤ ε+ 2`δ.
Definition 3.4 (Balanced Hashing). Let h := {hs : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m}s∈{0,1}d be a hash function family.
For X ⊆ {0, 1}n, s ∈ {0, 1}d, x ∈ X we define LoadX (x, s) := |{x′ ∈ X : hs(x′) = hs(x)}| .6 We say that
the family h is (k, t, ε)-balanced if for all X ⊆ {0, 1}n of size |X | = 2k, we have
Pr
[
LoadX (X,S) > t2k−m
]
≤ ε
where S,X are uniformly random and independent over {0, 1}d,X respectively.
Lemma 3.5 (Balanced ⇒ Condenser). Let H := {hs : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m}s∈{0,1}d be a (k, t, ε)-balanced
hash function family. Then the function Cond : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m defined by Cond(x; s) = hs(x)
is a (k, `, ε)-condenser for ` = log(t).
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can restrict ourselves to showing that Cond satisfies the condenser
definition for every flat source X which is uniformly random over some subset X ⊆ {0, 1}n, |X | = 2k. Let
us take such a source X over the set X , and define a modified hash family h˜ = {h˜s : X → {0, 1}m}s∈{0,1}d
which depends on X and essentially “re-balances” h on the set X . In particular, for every pair (s, x)
such that LoadhX (x, s) ≤ t2k−m we set h˜s(x) := hs(x), and for all other pairs (s, x) we define h˜s(x) in
such a way that Loadh˜X (x, s) ≤ t2k−m (the super-script is used to denote the hash function with respect
to which we are computing the load). It is easy to see that this “re-balancing” is always possible. We
6Note that we allow x′ = x and so LoadX (x, s) ≥ 1.
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use the re-balanced hash function h˜ to define a joint distribution (S, Y ) by choosing S uniformly at
random over {0, 1}d, choosing X uniformly/independently over X and setting Y = h˜S(X). It’s easy to
check that the statistical distance between (S,Cond(X;S)) and (S, Y ) is at most Pr[hS(X) 6= h˜S(X)] ≤
Pr[LoadhX (X,S) > t2k−m] ≤ ε. Furthermore, for every s ∈ {0, 1}d, we have:
H∞(Y |S = s) = − log(max
y
Pr[Y = y|S = s])
= − log(max
y
Pr[X ∈ h˜−1s (y)]) ≥ − log(t2k−m/2k) = m− log t.
Therefore Cond is a (k, ` = log t, ε)-condenser.
Lemma 3.6 (UExtract⇒ Balanced). Let UExt : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be a (k, δ, ε)-UExtractor for
some, ε > δ > 0. Then the hash family H = {hs : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m}s∈{0,1}d defined by hs(x) = UExt(x; s)
is (k, ε/δ, ε)-balanced.
Proof. Let t = ε/δ and assume that H is not (k, t, ε)-balanced. Then there exists some set X ⊆ {0, 1}n,
|X | = 2k such that εˆ := Pr[LoadX (X,S) > t2k−m] > ε where X is uniform over X and S is uniform over
{0, 1}d. Let Xs ⊆ X be defined by Xs := {x ∈ X : LoadX (x, s) > t2k−m} and let εs def= |Xs|/2k. By
definition εˆ =
∑
s 2
−dεs. Define Ys ⊆ {0, 1}m via Ys := hs(Xs). Now by definition, each y ∈ Ys has at least
t2k−m pre-images in Xs and therefore δs def= |Ys|/2m ≤ |Xs|/(t2k−m2m) ≤ εs/t and δ :=
∑
s 2
−dδs ≤ εˆ/t.
Define the distinguisher D via D(y, s) = 1 iff y ∈ Ys. Then D is a δ-distinguisher for δ ≤ εˆ/t ≤ ε/t
but Pr[D(hS(X), S) = 1] = εˆ ≥ ε. Therefore, UExt is not a (k, ε/t, ε)-UExtractor.
Summary. Taking all of the above lemmata together, we see that they are close to tight. In particular,
for any ε > δ > 0, we get:
(k, δ, ε)-UExt
Lem.3.6⇒ (k, ε/δ, ε)-Balanced Lem.3.5⇒ (k, log(ε/δ), ε)-Condenser Lem.3.3⇒ (k, δ, 2ε)-UExt
4 Constructing Unpredictability Extractors
Given the connections established in the previous section, we have paved the road for constructing
unpredictability extractors via balanced hash functions, which is a seemingly simpler property to analyze.
Indeed, we will give relatively simple lemmas showing that “sufficiently independent” hash functions are
balanced. This will lead to the following parameters (restating Theorem 1.3 from the introduction):
Theorem 4.1. There exists an efficient (k, δ, ε)-unpredictability extractor UExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d →
{0, 1}m for the following parameters:
1. When k = m (no entropy loss), we get ε = (1 + log(1/δ))δ.
2. When k ≥ m+ log log 1/δ + 4, we get ε = 3δ.
3. In general, ε = O(1 + 2m−k log(1/δ))δ.
In all cases, the function UExt is simply a (log(1/δ) +O(1))-wise independent hash function and the seed
length is d = O(n log(1/δ)).
Although these constructions may already be practical, the level of independence we will need is
O(log 1/δ), which will result in a large seed O(n log(1/δ)). We will show how to achieve similar parameters
with a shorter seed O(n log k) in Section 4.2. We now proceed to prove all of the parts of Theorem 4.1 by
constructing “good” balanced hash functions and using our connections between balanced hashing and
unpredictability extractors from the previous section.
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4.1 Sufficient Independence Provides Balance
First we start with a simple case where the output m is equal to the entropy k.
Lemma 4.2. Let H := {hs : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k}s∈{0,1}d be (t + 1)-wise independent. Then it is (k, t, ε)-
balanced where ε ≤ ( et )t and e is the base of the natural logarithm.
Proof. Fix any set X ⊆ {0, 1}n of size |X | = 2k. Let X be uniform over X and S be uniform/independent
over {0, 1}d. Then
Pr[LoadX (X,S) > t] ≤ Pr[ ∃C ⊆ X , |C| = t ∀x′ ∈ C : hS(x′) = hS(X) ∧ x′ 6= X]
≤
∑
C⊆X ,|C|=t
Pr[∀x′ ∈ C : hS(x′) = hS(X) ∧ x′ 6= X]
≤
(
2k
t
)
2−tk ≤
(
e2k
t
)t
2−tk ≤
(e
t
)t
.
Corollary 4.3. For any 0 < ε < 2−2e, any δ > 0, a (dlog(1/ε)e + 1)-wise independent hash family
H = {hs : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k}s∈{0,1}d is:
(k, log(1/ε), ε)-balanced, (k, log log(1/ε), ε)-condenser, (k, δ, log(1/ε)δ + ε)-UExtractor.
In particular, setting δ = ε, it is a (k, δ, (1 + log(1/δ))δ)-UExtractor.
Proof. Set t = dlog(1/ε)e in Lemma 4.2 and notice that ( et )t ≤ 2−t ≤ ε as long as t ≥ 2e.
This establishes part (1) of Theorem 4.1. Next we look at a more general case where k may be larger
than m. This also covers the case k = m but gets a somewhat weaker bound. It also requires a more
complex tail bound for q-wise independent variables.
Lemma 4.4. Let H := {hs : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m}s∈{0,1}d be (q + 1)-wise independent for some even q.
Then, for any α > 0, it is (k, 1 + α, ε)-balanced where ε ≤ 8
(
q2k−m+q2
(α2k−m−1)2
)q/2
.
Proof. Let X ⊆ {0, 1}n be a set of size |X | = 2k, X be uniform over X , and S be uniform/independent
over {0, 1}d. Define the indicator random variables C(x∗, x) to be 1 if hS(x) = hS(x∗) and 0 otherwise.
Then:
Pr[LoadX (X,S) > (1 + α)2k−m] =
∑
x∗∈X
Pr[X = x∗] Pr[LoadX (x∗, S) > (1 + α)2k−m]
= 2−k
∑
x∗∈X
Pr
 ∑
x∈X\{x∗}
C(x∗, x) + 1 > (1 + α)2k−m

≤ 8
(
q2k−m + q2
(α2k−m − 1)2
)q/2
Where the last line follows from the tail inequality Lemma 2.1 with the random variables {C(x∗, x)}x∈X\{x∗}
which are q-wise independent and have expected value µ = E[
∑
x∈X\{x∗}C(x
∗, x)] = (2k−1)2−m ≤ 2k−m,
and by setting A = (1 + α)2k−m − 1− µ ≥ α2k−m − 1; recall that C(x∗, x∗) is always 1 and C(x∗, x) for
x 6= x∗ is 1 with probability 2−m.
Corollary 4.5. For any 0 < ε < 2−5, k ≥ m+ log log(1/ε) + 4, a (dlog(1/ε)e+ 6)-wise independent hash
function family H = {hs : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m}s∈{0,1}d is:
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(k, 2, ε)-balanced, (k, 1, ε)-condenser, (k, δ, 2δ + ε)-UExt for any δ > 0.
In particular, setting δ = ε, it is a (k, δ, 3δ)-UExt.
Proof. Set α := 1 and choose q ∈ (log(1/ε) + 3, log(1/ε) + 5) to be an even integer. Notice that 2k−m ≥
16 log(1/ε) ≥ 8(log(1/ε) + 5) ≥ 8q since log(1/ε) ≥ 5. Then we apply Lemma 4.4
8
(
q2k−m + q2
(α2k−m − 1)2
)q/2
= 8
(
q(1 + q/2k−m)
2k−m(1− 1/2k−m)2
)q/2
≤ 8
(
2q
2k−m
)q/2
≤ ε.
The above corollary establishes part (2) of Theorem 4.1. The next corollary gives us a general
bound which establishes part (3) of the theorem. Asymptotically it implies variants of Corollary 4.5 and
Corollary 4.3, but with worse constants.
Corollary 4.6. For any ε > 0 and q := dlog(1/ε)e+ 3, a (q + 1)-wise independent hash function family
H = {hs : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m}s∈{0,1}d is (k, 1 + α, ε)-balanced for
α = 4
√
q2m−k + (q2m−k)2 = O(2m−k log(1/ε) + 1).
By setting δ = ε, a (log 1δ + 4)−wise independent hash function is a (k, δ, O(1 + 2m−k log 1δ )δ)-UExtactor.
Proof. The first part follows from Lemma 4.4 by noting that
8
(
q2k−m + q2
(α2k−m − 1)2
)q/2
≤ 8
(
q2k−m + q2
1
4(α2
k−m)2
)q/2
≤ 8
(
1
4
)q/2
≤ ε.
For the second part, we can consider two cases. If q2m−k ≤ 1 then α ≤ 4√2 and we are done. Else,
α ≤ 4√2(q2m−k) = 4√2(log(1/ε) + 3)2m−k.
4.2 Minimizing the Seed Length
In both of the above constructions (Corollary 4.3, Corollary 4.5), to get an (k, δ, ε)-UExtractor, we
need a O(log(1/ε))-wise independent hash function hs : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, which requires a seed-length
d = O(log(1/ε) · n). Since in many applications, we envision ε ≈ 2−k, this gives a seed d = O(kn).
We should contrast this with standard extractors constructed using universal hash functions (via the
leftover-hash lemma), where the seed-length is d = n. We now show how to optimize the seed-length of
UExtractors, first to d = O(n log k) and eventually to d = O(k log k). We adapt the technique of Celis
et al. [CRSW11] which shows how to construct hash functions with a small seed that achieve essentially
optimal “max-load” (e.g., minimize the hash value with the most items inside it). We show that a lightly
modified analysis can also be used to show that such hash functions are “balanced” with essentially
optimal parameters.
Almost Independence. We start by recalling the notion of q-wise δ-dependent hash functions.
Definition 4.7 ((Almost) Independent Hashing). A hash family H : {h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m}s∈{0,1}d
is q-wise δ-dependent if for any distinct x1, . . . , xq ∈ {0, 1}n,
(hS(x1), . . . , hS(xq)) ≈δ (U1, . . . , Uq)
where S is uniformly random over {0, 1}d and Ui are uniformly random/independent over {0, 1}m.
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Such almost independent hash functions can be constructed using ε-biased distributions [NN93,
AGHP92]. The following parameters are stated in [CRSW11].
Lemma 4.8. For any integers n, `, there exists a family of q-wise δ-dependent hash functions from n-bits
to `-bits with seed-length d = O(n+ ` · q + log(1/δ)).
We will also rely on the following tail-bound from [CRSW11].
Lemma 4.9 ([CRSW11], Lemma 2.2). Suppose that X1, . . . , Xn are q-wise δ-dependent random variables
taking values in [0, 1]. Let X := X1 + · · ·+Xn and define µ := E[X] be the expectation of the sum. Then,
for any α > 0, Pr[X ≥ (1 + α)µ] ≤ 2
(
qn
(αµ)2
)q/2
+ δ
(
n
αµ
)q
.
Construction. Our goal is to construct a hash function family H = {hs : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k}s∈{0,1}d
such that H is (k, t, ε)-balanced for some small ε ≈ 2−t. Assume that n ≥ k ≥ t. We will choose hs to be a
concatenation of several hash functions with gradually increasing levels of independence qi and gradually
decreasing output size `i while keeping the product qi`i = O(t) essentially constant. More precisely, let
H1, . . . ,Hr,Hr+1 be hash function families, where each family Hi = {hsi : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}`i}si∈{0,1}di
is qi-wise δi-dependent with the parameters qi, `i and δi being chosen as follows:
• For i = 1, . . . , r (where r will be specified later), set `i so that
∑i
j=1 `i = b
(
1− (34)i) kc. Note that
this means `i =
1
4(
3
4)
i−1k ± 1 and k −∑ij=1 `i = 3`i ± 4 = 4`i+1 ± 5.
• For i = 1, . . . , r, set qi := 4dt/`ie+ 1.
• Set r be the largest integer such that `r ≥ log t+2 log log4/3 k+7. Note that r ≤ log4/3 k = O(log k).
• Set `r+1 := k −
∑r
i=1 `i. This gives `r+1 = O(log t+ log log k). Set qr+1 = 4t+ 1
• For i = 1, . . . , r, set δi := 2−18k and set δr+1 = 2−t`r+1−2t = 2−O(k log k).
Let H := H1 ◦ . . . ◦ Hr+1 meaning that H = {hs : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k}s∈{0,1}d is defined by
hs(x) := hs1(x)|| · · · ||hsr+1(x)
where s = (s1, . . . , sr, sr+1) and hsi ∈ Hi and ‘||’ denotes concatenation. Notice that, using the parameters
of Lemma 4.8 for the function families Hi, we can get the total seed-length to be d = |s| =
∑r+1
i=1 di =
O(n log k), assuming n ≥ k ≥ t.
Theorem 4.10. The above family H : {hs : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k}s∈{0,1}d is (k, t, 2−t)-balanced for any
n ≥ k ≥ t ≥ log log4/3 k + 4 = log log k +O(1).
The seed length is d = O(n log k). In particular, H is also (k, log(t), 2−t)-condenser and a (k, δ, tδ+ 2−t)-
UExtract for any δ > 0.
We can also consider the family H′ : H1 ◦ . . . ◦ Hr, defined analogously to the above but excluding
Hr+1, so that H′ = {hs : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m}s∈{0,1}d′ where d′ =
∑r
i=1 di and m = k−`r+1 = k−O(log t+
log log k).
Theorem 4.11. The above family H′ : {hs : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m}s∈{0,1}d′ is (k, (e + 1), ε)-balanced for
any
n ≥ k ≥ t ≥ log log4/3 k + 4 = log log k +O(1),m = k − `r+1 = k −O(log t+ log log k)
with ε = 2−t. The seed length is d = O(n log k). In particular, H is also (k, log(e+ 1), ε)-condenser and
a (k, δ, (e+ 1)δ + ε)-UExtract for any δ > 0.
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Proof of Theorem 4.10 and Theorem 4.11. We start with the proof of Theorem 4.10. Let us choose
some arbitrary set X ⊆ {0, 1}n, |X | = 2k and some arbitrary x ∈ X . For a seed s = (s1, . . . , sr+1) ←
{0, 1}d=
∑r+1
i di we will iteratively define X0 = X \{x} and for i > 0, Xi = {x′ ∈ Xi−1 : hsi(x′) = hsi(x)}.
We start with the following lemma:
Lemma 4.12. Let α = 1/r and assume that for some i ∈ {1, . . . , r}, we have |Xi−1| ≤ (1+α)i−12k−
∑i−1
j=1 `j .
Then
Pr
si←{0,1}di
[
|Xi| > (1 + α)i2k−
∑i
j=1 `j
]
< 3 · 2−2t
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume the worst-case scenario that |Xi−1| = b(1 + α)i−12k−
∑i−1
j=1 `jc ≥
2k−
∑i−1
j=1 `j . In this case, we can write the above as:
Pr
si←{0,1}di
[
|Xi| > (1 + α)i2k−
∑i−1
j=1 `j
]
≤ Pr
si←{0,1}di
 ∑
x′∈Xi−1
{
1 if hsi(x
′) = hsi(x)
0 otherwise
}
> (1 + α)
|Xi−1|
2`i

≤ 2
(
4dt/`ie|Xi−1|
(α|Xi−1|/2`i)2
)2dt/`ie
+ δi
( |Xi−1|
α|Xi−1|/2`i
)4dt/`ie
(5)
≤ 2
(
4dt/`ie22`ir2
2k−
∑i−1
j=1 `j
)2dt/`ie
+ δi(2
4dt/`ie(`i+log r))
≤ 2
(
4dt/`ier2
22`i−5
)2dt/`ie
+ δi2
4(t+`i+t log r/`i+log r) (6)
≤ 2 · 2−2t + 2−2t ≤ 3 · 2−2t (7)
Line (5) follows from Lemma 4.9 and the fact that the variables being summed are (qi − 1)-wise δi-
dependent with mean µ = |Xi−1|
2`i
. Line (6) follows from the fact that k −∑i−1j=1 `j ≥ 4`i − 5. Line (7)
follows from the fact that
2`i ≥ 2`r ≥ 2log t+2 log r+7 ≥ 4tr225 ≥ 4dt/`ier2/2−5
which gives the bound for the left-hand summand, and
4(t+ `i + t log r/`i + log r) ≤ 4(t+ k + t+ log log4/3 k) ≤ 16k
which gives the bound for the right hand summand as long as δi ≤ 2−18k ≤ 2−16k−2t.
By using Lemma 4.12 inductively, we get Prs1,...,sr
[
|Xr| ≥ (1 + 1/r)r2k−
∑r
j=1 `j
]
≤ (3r)2−2t. Since
(1 + 1/r)r ≤ e and `r+1 = k −
∑r
j=1 `j , we can rewrite the above as:
Pr
s1,...,sr
[
|Xr| ≥ e2`r+1
]
≤ (3r)2−2t (8)
Assuming that |Xr| ≤ e2`r+1 . Then
Pr[|Xr+1| ≥ t] = Pr
sr+1←{0,1}dr+1
[ ∃C ⊆ Xr, |C| = t ∀x′ ∈ C : hsr+1(x′) = hsr+1(x)]
≤
∑
C⊆Xr,|C|=t
Pr[∀x′ ∈ C : hsr+1(x′) = hsr+1(x)]
≤
(|Xr|
t
)
(2−t`r+1 + δr+1)
(
e22`r+1
t
)t
(2−t`r+1 + δr+1)
≤ (e2/t)t + δr+12t`r+1 ≤ 2−2t + 2−2t ≤ 2 · 2−2t.
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Therefore, altogether, we have
Pr
s←{0,1}s
[Xr+1 ≥ t] ≤ 3(r + 1)2−2t ≤ 3(log4/3 k + 1)2−2t ≤ 2−(t+1)
since we chose t so that 2t−1 ≥ 3(log4/3 k + 1). Moreover, we have LoadHX (x, s) = |Xr+1| + 1 (since we
must also include the point x itself). Therefore Pr[LoadHX (X,S) ≥ t + 1] ≤ 2−(t+1) which proves the
Theorem 4.10.
To prove Theorem 4.11, we go back to equation (8) and notice that Prs1,...,sr
[|Xr| ≥ e2`r+1] ≤
(3r)2−2t ≤ 3(r + 1)2−2t ≤ 2−t. Combining this with the fact that LoadH′X (x, s) = |Xr+1| + 1, we get
for every X and x ∈ X :
Pr
s←{0,1}d′
[LoadH
′
X (x, s) ≥ (e+ 1)2k−m] = Pr[|Xr+1| ≥ e2`r+1 ] ≤ 2−t.
This concludes the proof.
Additional Optimization. We note that it is easy to reduce the seed further from d = O(n log k) to
d = O(k log k) while achieving essentially the same bounds as Theorem 4.10 and Theorem 4.11. The idea
is that we can always covert an (n, k) source into an (n′, k) source for some n′ = O(k). We simply first
hash the n bit input into a smaller n′ bit input using a universal hash function.
Lemma 4.13. Let X be any (n, k)-source and let H = {hs : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n′}s∈{0,1}d be a ρ-
universal hash function, meaning that for any x 6= x′ ∈ {0, 1}n, Prs←{0,1}d [hs(x) = hs(x′)] ≤ ρ. Then
Prs←{0,1}d [hs(X) is a (n′, k)− source] ≥ 1− 22kρ.
Proof. It suffices to show that the above holds for all flat sources X, distributed uniformly at random
over some X ⊆ {0, 1}n, |X | = 2k. Moreover hs(X) is an (n′, k)-source as long as |hs(X )| = 2k, meaning
that there are no collisions. The probability that this does not happen is:
Pr
s←{0,1}d
[|hs(X )| < 2k] ≤ Pr
s←{0,1}d
[∃x1 6= x2 ∈ X : hs(x1) = hs(x2)] ≤ 22kρ.
Polynomial evaluation over the field F2n′ gives us a hash family H = {hs : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
′}s∈{0,1}n′
which is ρ-universal for ρ = dn/n′e2−n′ . Setting n′ = 3k and plugging this into the above lemma, we
see that hs(X) is a (3k, k) source with probability 1 − dn/3ke2−k ≥ 1 − 2−(k−logn). Therefore, by first
applying the above universal hash function from n bits to n′ = 3k bits and then a (k, t, ε)-balanced hash
from n′ = 3k bits to m bits, we get a (k, t, ε + 2−(k−logn))-balanced hash from n to m bits. Therefore,
we can efficiently achieve essentially the same parameters as Theorem 4.10 and Theorem 4.11 but with
reduced seed length d = O(n′ log k + n′) = O(k log k).
4.3 A Probabilistic Method Bound
We also give a probabilistic method argument showing the existence of unpredictability extractors with
very small seed length d ≈ log(1/δ) + log(n− k). In other words, unpredictability extractors with small
entropy loss do not, in principle, require a larger seed than standard randomness extractors (with much
larger entropy loss).
See e.g., Theorem 4.1 of [MR95], for the following Chernoff tail-bound.
Lemma 4.14 (Multiplicative Chernoff Bound). Let X1, . . . , Xn be independent (but not necessarily iden-
tical) random variables taking on values in {0, 1} with µ := E[∑ni=1Xi]. Then, for any α > 1:
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
Xi > αµ
]
<
(
e(α−1)
αα
)δn
≤
{
e−µ(α−1)2/4 1 < α ≤ 2e
2−αµ α ≥ 2e
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We use the above tail-bound to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.15. There exists a (k, δ, ε)-UExtract UExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m as long as either:
ε ≥ max{ 2eδ , (n− k + 2)2−d + log(e/δ)δ2m−k }
2eδ ≥ ε ≥ δ + 2δ
√
(1/δ)(n− k + 2)2−d + log(e/δ)2m−k
In particular, as long as the seed-length d ≥ log(1/δ) + log(n− k + 2) + 3 we get:
• In general: ε = O(1 + log(1/δ)2m−k)δ.
• When k = m and δ < 2−2e: ε = (2 + log(1/δ))δ.
• When k ≥ m+ log log(e/δ) + 3: ε = 2δ.
Proof. We use the probabilistic method argument. For simplicity of notation, let N = 2n,K = 2k, D =
2d,M = 2m. Let R : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be chosen uniformly at random from the setR of all such
functions. Then R fails to be a (k, δ, ε)-Uextract if there exists some subset X ⊆ {0, 1}n, |X| = K and
some (deterministic) δ-distinguisher D such that |{x ∈ X , s ∈ {0, 1}d : D(R(x; s), s) = 1}| > εKD. For
a fixed X ,D and a uniformly random R, we can define indicator random variables {V Dx,s}x∈X ,s∈{0,1}d via
V Dx,s = 1 iff D(R(x; s), s) = 1. These variables are mutually independent (but not identically) distributed
with Pr[V Dx,s = 1] = δs :=
|{y∈{0,1}m:D(y,s)=1}|
2m and E[
∑
x,s V
D
x,s] =
∑
x,s δs = δKD. Therefore, we have:
Pr
R
[R is not a (k, δ, ε)-UExtract] ≤ Pr
R
∃D,X s.t. ∑
x∈X ,s∈{0,1}d
V Px,s > εDK

≤
∑
D,X
Pr
R
 ∑
x∈X ,s∈{0,1}d
V Dx,s > (ε/δ)δKD
 (9)
We now divide the analysis into two cases. In the first case, assume that ε ≥ 2eδ. In this case, we
continue from (9) and use Chernoff to get:
Pr
R
[R is not a (k, δ, ε)-UExtract] <
(
N
K
)(
MD
δMD
)
2−εKD
≤
(
eN
K
)K (e
δ
)δMD
2−εKD
≤ 2(log e+n−k)K+(log e+log(1/δ))δMD−εKD
In particular, the above is strictly less than 1 as long as:
ε > max{ 2eδ , (log e+ n− k)/D + (log e+ log(1/δ)) δM/K }.
In the second case, assume ε < 2eδ. In this case, we continue from (9) and use Chernoff to get:
Pr
R
[R is not a (k, δ, ε)-UExtract] <
(
N
K
)(
MD
δMD
)
2−δKD(ε/δ−1)
2/4
≤
(
eN
K
)K (e
δ
)δMD
2−δKD(ε/δ−1)
2/4
≤ 2(log e+n−k)K+(log e+log(1/δ))δMD−δKD(ε/δ−1)2/4
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In particular, the above is strictly less than 1 as long as:
(ε/δ − 1)2 ≥ (log e+ n− k)/(δD) + (log e+ log(1/δ))M/K
which occurs as long as:
ε ≥ δ + 2δ
√
(log e+ n− k)/(δD) + (log e+ log(1/δ))M/K.
5 SRT Lower-Bound: Samplability Doesn’t Improve Entropy Loss
In this section, we prove the ‘SRT’ conjecture of Dachman-Soled et al. [DGKM12], showing that ran-
domness extractors need to incur a 2 log 1/ε entropy loss (difference between entropy and output length)
even if we only require them to work for efficiently samplable sources. The lower-bound even holds if the
extractor itself is not required to be efficient. The efficient source for which we show a counter-example
is sampled via a 4-wise independent hash function. That is, we define the source X = hr(Z) where
Z ← {0, 1}k is chosen uniformly at random and hr : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n is chosen from some 4-wise
independent hash function family. The choice of the seed r will need to be fixed non-uniformly; we show
that for any “candidate extractor” Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m there is some seed r such that the
above efficiently sampleable (n, k)-source X makes the statistical distance between (Ext(X;S), S) and
the uniform distribution at least ≈ 2(m−k)/2.
5.1 Preliminaries: Anti-Concentration Bounds
Lemma 5.1 ([Ber91], Theorem 2.3). For any random variable V , we have: E[|V |] ≥ E[V 2]3/2E[V 4]1/2 .
Corollary 5.2. Let V1, . . . , Vq be 4-wise independent random variables over R such that for all i ∈ [q] we
have E[Vi] = 0,E[V 2i ] ∈ [p/4, p], E[V 4i ] ≤ p for some p ≥ 1/q. Then E[|
∑q
i=1 Vi|] ≥ 116
√
q · p.
Proof. Let us define V :=
∑q
i=1 Vi. Then
E[V 2] =
∑
i,j∈[q]
E[Vi · Vj ] =
∑
i∈[q]
E[V 2i ] ≥ qp/4
E[V 4] =
∑
i,j,r,t∈[q]
E[Vi · Vj · Vr · Vt] =
∑
i∈[q]
E[V 4i ] + 3
∑
i 6=j∈[q]
E[V 2i ]E[V 2j ]
≤ qp+ 3(qp)2 ≤ 4(qp)2
Therefore, by Lemma 5.1, we have
E[|V |] ≥ E[V
2]3/2
E[V 4]1/2
≥ (
1
4qp)
3/2
(4(qp)2)1/2
=
1
16
√
qp
5.2 Statement of Lower Bound
Let Ext : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be a candidate strong extractor, and let X be some random variable
over {0, 1}n. Define the distinguishability of Ext on X via:
Dist(X)
def
=
1
2
∑
s∈{0,1}d,y∈{0,1}m
|Pr[S = s,Ext(X; s) = y]− Pr[S = s, Y = y]|
=
1
2d+1
∑
s∈{0,1}d,y∈{0,1}m
∣∣∣∣Pr[Ext(X, s) = y]− 12m
∣∣∣∣ .
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where S, Y are uniformly and independently distributed over {0, 1}d,{0, 1}m respectively. Note that
Dist(X) is simply the statistical distance between (S,Ext(X;S)) and (S,Um) where Um is uniformly
random m bit string.
Theorem 5.3. For any (possibly inefficient) function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m, any positive
integer k ≥ m + 2 such that n > 3k −m + 14, there exists a distribution X with H∞(X) ≥ k, which is
efficiently samplable by a poly(n)-size circuit, such that Dist(X) ≥ 2(m−k)/2−8.
Alternatively, for any positive k ≥ m such that n > k + log(k) + 11, there exists some distribu-
tion X with H∞(X) ≥ k, which is efficiently samplable by a poly(n)-size circuit such that Dist(X) ≥
2(m−k−log(k))/2−9.
5.3 Proof of Lower Bound
Let X = {x1, . . . , x2k} ⊆ {0, 1}n be a multiset (i.e, we may have xi = xj for i 6= j) and let X be a random
variable distributed uniformly over X (i.e., to sample x ← X, choose random i ∈ [2k] and output xi).
Define Dist(X ) def= Dist(X). Then we can write:
Dist(X ) = 1
2d+1
∑
s∈{0,1}d,y∈{0,1}m
∣∣∣∣Pr[Ext(X, s) = y]− 12m
∣∣∣∣
=
1
2d+1
∑
s∈{0,1}d,y∈{0,1}m
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[2k] bi,s,y
2k
− 1
2m
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
2d+k+1
∑
s∈{0,1}d,y∈{0,1}m
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[2k]
(
bi,s,y − 2−m
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
where bi,s,y = 1 if Ext(xi; s) = y and 0 otherwise.
Now let us choose the multiset X randomly via X = {X1, . . . , X2k} where the Xi are 4-wise indepen-
dent random variables, each of which is uniform over {0, 1}n. For example, let H be a 4-wise independent
family of hash functions h : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n and define Xi = h(i) where the randomness is over the
choice of h ← H. Such hash functions can be efficient so that we can compute h(i) in poly(n)-time. In
that case, taking an expectation over the choice of X , we can write:
E[Dist(X )] = 1
2d+k+1
∑
s∈{0,1}d,y∈{0,1}m
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[2k]
(
Bi,s,y − 2−m
)∣∣∣∣∣∣

where Bi,s,y is an indicator random variable which is 1 if Ext(Xi; s) = y and 0 otherwise. We now prove
the following claim, which is the key of the argument, and says that for every s, y the above expectation
is sufficiently large.
Claim 5.4. For all s ∈ {0, 1}d, y ∈ {0, 1}m, we have E
[∣∣∣∑i∈[2k] (Bi,s,y − 2−m)∣∣∣] ≥ 1642(k−m)/2
(Before giving a formal proof, let us give some intuition. For simplicity, assume that the extractor
is regular so that, for every s, y we have E[Bi,s,y] = |{x∈{0,1}
n : Ext(x;s)=y}|
2n = 2
−m. Then, if we let
Vi := Bi,s,y − 2−m and V =
∑
Vi, we have E[Vi] = 0, E[V ] = 0 and Var[Vi] ≈ 2−m. The claim boils
down to an anti-concentration bound showing that V is unlikely to be too close to its mean. If the Vi
variables were completely independent then, by the central limit theorem, V “approaches” a gaussian
distribution with mean 0 and and standard deviation 2(k−m)/2 (how closely it approaches this distribution
can be quantified e.g., via the Berry-Esseen theorem). Therefore |V | is at least 2(k−m)/2 with constant
probability and E[|V |] ≥ Ω(2(k−m)/2). To prove the above claim, we need to generalize this to the case
where the Vi are only 4-wise independent and also handle the case where the extractor is not regular.)
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Proof of Claim 5.4. Let us fix some arbitrary s ∈ {0, 1}d, y ∈ {0, 1}m. Let p def= |{x∈{0,1}n : Ext(x;s)=y}|2n ,
so that for all i ∈ [2k] we have, E[Bi,s,y] = Pr[Bi,s,y = 1] = p (if the extractor is regular than p = 2−m).
First, let us consider the case where the extractor is far from regular at s, y and |p−2−m| ≥ 164 ·2−(k+m)/2.
In the case, by Jensen’s inequality and the linearity of expectation, we have:
E
 ∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[2k]
(
Bi,s,y − 2−m
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
 ≥
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[2k]
E[Bi,s,y]
− 2k−m
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≥ 2k|p− 2−m| ≥ 1
64
2(k−m)/2
which matches the claim.
Therefore, we are left to consider the alternate case, where the extractor is close to regular at s, y and
|p− 2−m| < 1642−(k+m)/2. In this case, we have the bounds:
p ≤ 2−m + 2−(k+m)/2 ≤ 2−m + 2−m−1 ≤ 3
4
2kp ≥ 2k(2−m − 2−(k+m)/2) ≥ 2k(2−m − 2−m−1) ≥ 2k−m−1
where the latter also implies p ≥ 2−k since k ≥ m+1. Let us define the random variables Vi := (Bi,s,y−p).
Then these variables are 4-wise independent, and for all i ∈ [2k] we have E[Vi] = 0 and:
E[V 2i ] = p(1− p)2 + p2(1− p) = p(1− p) ∈ [p/4, p]
E[V 4i ] = p(1− p)4 + p4(1− p) ≤ p.
Let use define V :=
∑
i∈[2k] Vi. Then, by applying Corollary 5.2 with q = 2
k, we have
E[|V |] ≥ 1
16
(2kp)1/2 ≥ 1
32
2(k−m)/2.
Finally, we have:
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[2k]
(
Bi,s,y − 2−m
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
 = E
 ∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[2k]
(Bi,s,y − p) +
∑
i∈[2k]
(p− 2−m)
∣∣∣∣∣∣

≥ E[|V |]− 2k|p− 2−m| ≥ 1
64
2(k−m)/2
which concludes the proof of the claim.
Using the above claim, we get a bound for the expected distinguishing advantage as:
E[Dist(X )] = 1
2d+k+1
∑
s∈{0,1}d,y∈{0,1}m
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[2k]
(
Bi,s,y − 2−m
)∣∣∣∣∣∣

≥ 1
2
· 2
m
2k
· 1
64
· 2(k−m)/2 = 1
128
2(m−k)/2 = 2(m−k)/2−7.
This already shows the expected distinguishing advantage for X is sufficiently high. We now want to
show that the distinguishing advantage is high with “good” probability:
Pr
[
Dist(X ) ≤ 1
2
E[Dist(X )]
]
= Pr
[
1− Dist(X ) ≥ 1− 1
2
E[Dist(X )]
]
≤ 1− E[Dist(X )]
1− 12 E[Dist(X )]
≤ 1− E[Dist(X )]2 ≤ 1− 2m−k−14
19
where the second line follows by Markov inequality and the fact that Dist(X ) ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, we get:
Pr[Dist(X ) > 2(m−k)/2−8] > 2m−k−14.
Next, we want to show that, if X is uniform over X , then H∞(X) ≥ k with overwhelming probability
over the choice of X . This happens as long as X1, . . . , X2k are all distinct, which happens with probability
≥ 1− Pr[∃i 6= j s.t. Xi = Xj ] ≥ 1− 22k−n. Therefore, we get:
Pr[(Dist(X ) > 2(m−k)/2−8) ∧ (H∞(X) ≥ k)] > 2(m−k)−14 − 22k−n > 0
as long as n > 3k − m + 14. This means that, as long as the above inequality is satisfied, there exits
some choice of X = {x1, . . . , x2k} from the 4-wise independent family (e.g., some hash function h ∈ H
with xi = h(i)) such that, if X is uniform over X , we have H∞(X) ≥ k, and Dist(X) ≥ 2(m−k)/2−8. As
long as the has function h is efficiently computable, we can sample from X efficiently in poly(n)-time.
Therefore, this proves the first part of theorem.
For the second part of the theorem, we first generalize our bound on entropy by choosing the elements
X1, . . . , X2k of X via a (t + 1)-wise independent distribution. In that case, we get H∞(X) ≥ k − log(t)
as long as the multiplicity of any element of X is at most t, which happens with probability
Pr[H∞(X) ≥ k − log(t)] ≥ 1−
(
2k
(t+ 1)
)
2−tn ≥ 2(t+1)k−tn.
Therefore, we get:
Pr[(Dist(X ) > 2(m−k)/2−8) ∧ (H∞(X) ≥ k − log(t))] > 2(m−k)−14 − 2(t+1)k−tn > 0
as long as n > k + 2k/t− (m− 14)/t.
Finally, to prove the second part of the theorem, for any k′ ≥ m, n > k′+log(k′)+11 let us apply the
generalized bound on k = k′ + log(k′) + 2 and t = 2k′. Note, k ≥ m+ 2 and n > k + 2k/t− (m− 14)/t.
Therefore, we get:
Pr[(Dist(X ) > 2(m−k′−log(k′))/2−9) ∧ (H∞(X) ≥ k′)] > 0.
This proves the second part of the theorem, by noting that we can (t = 2k′)-wise independent hash
functions can be efficiently computable in poly(n)-time.
6 Lower Bound: Square-Friendly Applications
In this section we prove Theorem 1.2. We define an application P for which we show that it is δ-square
secure in Claim 6.1, but a single run can be broken with advantage Ω(
√
δ · 2m−k). The two claims imply
Theorem 1.2.
We consider the following (artificial) indistinguishability application P between a distinguisher D and
a challenger C(r), which is initialized with a key r ∈ {0, 1}m and a bit b ∈ {0, 1} (where b = 0 means
we’re playing the random, and b = 1 the real game.)
• C(r) flips a biased coin α where Pr[α = 1] = √δ.
• If α = 0, C(r) sends ⊥ to D.
• If α = 1 and b = 1 then C(r) sends r to D.
• If α = 1 and b = 0 then C(r) samples a random r′ ← {0, 1}m and sends r′ to D.
• D outputs its guess b′.
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Let fD(r) denote the advantage of D (over the choice of b) in the above game
fD(r) = Pr
b←{0,1}
[b = b′]− 1/2
By the following claim P is δ/4-square secure (against computationally unbounded distinguishers and
any distribution of keys).
Claim 6.1. For any D and any possible key r, |fD(r)| ≤
√
δ/2 (and thus also E[fD(Um)2] ≤ δ/4)
Proof.
|Pr[b = b′]− 1/2| = |Pr[α = 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸√
δ
Pr[b = b′|α = 1] + Pr[α = 0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−√δ
Pr[b = b′|α = 0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
1/2
−1/2| (10)
≤ |
√
δ Pr[b = b′|α = 1]−
√
δ/2| ≤
√
δ/2 (11)
In the last step we used that any probability is between 0 and 1, in the second step we used that
conditioned on α = 0, D gets no information about the uniformly random bit b and thus any guess b′
will be equal to b with probability exactly 1/2.
Claim 6.2. For any family H = {hs} of functions {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, there exists an (even efficiently
samplable) (n, k)-source X and a (generally inefficient) distinguisher D(.) such that
E
S
[fD(S)(hS(X))] = Ω(
√
δ · 2m−k)
Proof. By Theorem 1.1 there exists an efficiently samplable X such that, for a random S, the statistical
distance of the derived key hS(X) from uniform is
∆((Um, S) , (hS(X), S)) = Ω(
√
2m−k)
And thus, we can define a (potentially inefficient) distinguisher D(S) that can distinguish (hS(X), S)
from (Um, S) with advantage Ω(
√
2m−k), and thus guess b with the same advantage whenever he gets to
see the key (i.e. α = 1).
Concretely, the distinguisher D(s) is defined as follows. If it receives ⊥ (i.e. α = 0), it simply
outputs a random guess b′ ← {0, 1}. If it receives some r ∈ {0, 1}m (i.e. α = 1), then it outputs 1 if
PrX(hs(X) = r) ≥ 2−m and 0 otherwise. We have
E
S
[fD(S)(hS(X))] = Pr[α = 0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−√δ
Pr[b = b′|α = 0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
1/2
+ Pr[α = 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸√
δ
Pr[b = b′|α = 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
1/2+Ω(
√
2m−k)
−1/2
= Ω(
√
δ · 2m−k)
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